Recently in Chapter 13 Category

HARP To Play New Tune: Preventing Doylestown Bankruptcy and Foreclosure

October 25, 2011

housSale.jpgPresident Obama on Monday announced a major overhaul to the Home Affordable Refinancing Program (HARP) in an effort to help those facing foreclosure. The move is also aimed to stimulate the national economy, generally, as the avoidance of foreclosures means less REO ("real estate owned" or bank owned) property and improved investment and expenditure. HARP was intended, when originally passed in 2009, to do these very same things, but the program has far under performed. Some of the reasons for failure seem to be addressed in this 2011 iteration.

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Same-Sex Couple Okay to File Joint Bankruptcy Says California Judge -- Not Applicable in Philadlephia (yet?)

June 20, 2011

Same-sex marriage is a hot topic, and whatever your own opinion about the matter, twenty (of the twenty-four) Central District of California bankruptcy judges, in a unique showing of solidarity, made their opinions public in the Chapter 13 case of partners Gene Balas and Carlos Morales. The couple filed their case (2:11-bk-17831) on February 24, 2011, having been legally married in California on August 20, 2008. [Note: about 18,000 same-sex couples were legally married in California during a brief period prior to the passage of Proposition 8, a voter-approved prohibition against same-gendered marriage. While the issue is not yet officially resolved, most believe that marriages which took place before Proposition 8's passage remain valid. Accordingly, Balas and Morales, who are amongst the 18,000 couples who wed during the permissive period, have a presumably valid and binding marriage.] rings.jpg

The United States Trustee moved to dismiss the bankruptcy on the auspices that the debtors were ineligible to file jointly (specifically by alleging that a single petition may be filed when filed by a debtor and the "individual's spouse). The Defense of Marriage Act - as is bankruptcy, of course, despite various nuance between states - a federal matter. This 1996 law states that "the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."

The bankruptcy judge actually assigned to the case, Thomas B. Donovan, could not rule on the constitutionality of the Defense Against Marriage law itself, of course, as that ulimtate issue will likely find its way to the US Supreme Court eventually. Rather, the judge expressly narrowed the issue to that which presented before his court: "whether some legally married couples are entitled to fewer rights than other legally married couples..." The judge held that all married couples are on equal footing and, accordingly, Balas and Morales could, indeed, file jointly. Here is a link to the ruling.

Assuming standing, ripeness, and a will to proceed, an interlocutory appeal up the federal court ladder might be filed by the trustee so as to set aside the ruling of Judge Donovan or perhaps delay its implementation. In any event, the signature portion of the ruling is four pages long, signed by 19 other judges, in a clear and unabashed statement that they all believe gay marriage should be allowed.

To say that twenty judges signed an order otherwise about no more than a narrow issue of standing to file a bankruptcy is to miss the point: the judges were signaling explicitly that each of them supports gay marriage. It is a passive way of joining a Political Action Committee, donating to a campaign, writing a newspaper editorial, etc. They are using the bench to announce their private opinions - something judges are generally discouraged from doing. Judging is applying the facts to the law; it is not a pulpit. While I appreciate that the judges are real people and that the issue of gay marriage is vogue, perhaps we could let the legislators legislate and/or the people vote on their own referendums without hearing it from the bench, too.

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Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Lien Strip Denied (Applicable to Philadelphia and Surrounding Areas) - McNeal v. GMAC

June 8, 2011

Periodically, it is a good idea to push the boundaries. This not only establishes where those boundaries are but also signifies a desire (by some, at least) to expand them. Such was the case in McNeal v. GMAC, a case out of Atlanta, Georgia. Heard before the United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia was case number 1:10-cv-1612-TCB. Courthose.jpgMs. Lorraine McNeal argued that her wholly unsecured second mortgage should be subject to a lien strip in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. The result was unsurprising: a lien strip is not appropriate in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. This upholds the status quo of a case called Dewsnup, which specifically denied a lienstrip under the auspices of 11 USC ยง506 strip-off. Nonetheless, it is good to ask the question. When one domino falls - that is, when one judge grants the relief - the door becomes slightly cracked, allowing other judges to rely on it, thereby opening the door ever so gradually. Ultimately, a case which fundamentally changes the established framework of lienstrips will find its way up the ladder to, presumably, the United States Supreme Court, but it takes a case to get a case heard before the court.

I can only assume that the lawyer who filed this case for Ms. McNeal understood the law and was, indeed, seeking to challenge the precedent of Dewsnup and the legacy of section 506 (and 1322). Nonetheless, the need for competent legal counsel is apparent when reading a ruling which so resoundingly denied the requested relief as though the debtor, Ms. McNeal, was silly to have even asked. Again, though, this case was likely a knock at the door with a hope of finding a crack.

This leaves, then, the status quo: a lienstrip is available in Chapter 13 bankruptcy only. Recall that a lienstrip allows a debtor to treat their second mortgage (or any junior lien) as unsecured debt - like a credit card debt - and get it discharged in their Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the same as the discharge granted in Chapter 7 bankruptcies. The only caveat is that the junior debt must be wholly unsecured. That is, the value (balance owed) of the senior loans must exceed the value of the home itself. Where a boat or other secured debt is concerned, there may be a way to do a "cram down" but that is for another posting (that would essentially be the court forcing the lender to accept the current market value for the property as opposed to the contract amount). Say, then, that the home is worth $300,000 but $350,000 is owed on the "first mortgage" and $50,000 is owed on a home equity line or "second." This $50,000 could be totally extinguished (like medical bills, for instance) if the debtor successfully completes their payment plan. Most Chapter 13 payment plans are between three to five years in length.

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Good News for Philadelphia Bankruptcy: Lien Stripping Status Quo Untouched By Court -- Suntrust Bank v. Millard

June 3, 2011

Change is often a good thing. Not changing can also be a good thing when that which is at issue is already a benefit to debtors. Such is the case in the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Suntrust Bank v. Millard where the court, in a brief and succinct statement, said, in essence, they refuse to find fault with the current status quo as it relates to lien stripping. A link to the statement is here, though the relevant portion is below:

"SunTrust appeals the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's order granting the Debtors' Motion to Avoid Lien. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. SunTrust Bank v. Millard, No. 8:08-cv-03002-MJG, 08-17964 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2008 & Sept. 28, 2009). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process."1350187_house_in_mendocino_california.jpg

What this means, of course, is that the landmark ruling of In Re Nobleman should not be disturbed. Of course, the courts can at any time revisit this issue. The Suntrust ruling is from December 2010 so the tides do not yet seem to be shifting to a new paradigm -- and this is a good thing -- but it would simply be a matter of judicial choice or legislative enactment to overturn the status quo in lien stripping.

Lien stripping is the process by which a junior loan on an upside down property (where the value of the home is less than that which is owed on the first or senior loans) is declared unsecured in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and can be, upon successful completion of the repayment plan, wholly discharged just like it was a credit card debt or other personal loan. If you are a struggling homeowner, contact a bankruptcy attorney and see if you might qualify for a lien strip.

Bankruptcy: A New Limit to the Vehicle Ownership Deduction Affects Car Owners in Philadelphia -- Ransom v. FIA Card Services

June 2, 2011

In Ransom v. FIA Card Services, the US Supreme Court wrote in its decision that "A debtor who does not make loan or lease payments may not take the car-ownership deduction." 1210839_car.jpg

The Court's opinion addressed the unique and limited question of whether a debtor whose income is above the state-established median may qualify for, and take, the "ownership" deduction in determining her projected disposable income. The Court addressed the Title 11 of the United States Code, Section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). The expenses themselves are determined by looking at the IRS's National and Local Standards; these detail the local "Ownership Costs" and "Operating Costs" for the debtor's jurisdiction.

The Court said that that "Ownership costs" relate exclusively to the payments on car loans (or leases), which is, of course, an expense not actually incurred by those who own their vehicles outright. Those debtors who do fully own their vehicles would instead be limited to taking the "Operating Costs" deduction. The Court's reasoning was focused on the fact that the Bankruptcy Code seeks to maximize the amount a debtor can pay under a Chapter 13 repayment plan.

If you want to read the actual court case, it is posted at the United States Supreme Court website, specifically at Ransom v. FIA.

The net result of this ruling is that those in Montgomery County or Chester County -- or anywhere else, really -- may not be able to take the dual deductions previously available to them. This perhaps creates the unusual situation of it being a benefit to a debtor to buy a car, to the extent their credit is sufficient to do so, before filing bankruptcy. The loan can then be assumed as part of the Chapter 13 repayment plan. The thinking is that since the debtor is obligated to maximize their payments to the creditors as part of this Chapter 13 plan, the debtor may as well drive a better car, with a lesser likelihood of breaking down and one which will maintain value beyond the bankruptcy repayment period.

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